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Abstract-Security is a prime concern in the design of a wide 
variety of embedded systems and security processors. So the 
customer security devices such as smart cards and security 
processors are prone to attack and there are on going research 
to protect these devices from attackers who intend to extract 
key information from these devices. Also an active attacker can 
induce errors during computation and exploit the faulty result 
to extract the key information embedded in the processor. Due 
to the design time issues weakness in the design is often 
revealed in the manufactured chips. Also because the post-
manufacture security evaluation is time consuming and 
expensive, these security issues have to be considered at the 
design phase. This paper outlines some of the hardware attacks 
and provides a general idea of the process of these attacks. 
Keywords: Hardware Attack, Optical Probing, Thermal 
Attack, Electromagnetic Attack, Timing Attack, Soft 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Similar to the virus attacks on the software, hardware can 
also be attacked by either insertion of the malicious logic 
into the circuit or by the malicious attack on the integrated 
circuit. Malicious logic can be inserted at different levels of 
abstraction in the supply chain architecture of the 
semiconductor IC. Also these days most of the complex 
digital circuits use third party Intellectual property (IP) 
blocks, instead of designing the circuit from the scratch 
which saves lots of work and time [1]. These IP blocks are 
themselves are untrustable as they may contain malicious 
code incorporated into them thus affecting the trustability of 
the entire system. Also another source of malicious logic 
injection is through the CAD tools which were used to 
design the hardware. These CAD tools themselves may 
contain software virus or a bug which will insert the 
malicious logic into the design.  
Further more many opportunities exist for the 
introduction of the unwanted features into the IC during the 
design cycle [3]. Although some of the phases in the supply 
chain structure of an ASIC design are trusted due to the fact 
that they are under the designer’s control, most of the 
phases are untrusted. So it is up to the end user to rely on 
the trustability of the hardware. 
The malicious logic can lead to various unwanted 
scenarios like causing the system to output data to the 
wrong port or address (information leakage), monitoring 
and modifying the system’s output data (tampering), or 
disabling the system by changing the system’s internal 
timing or control, e.g., holding the clock or bus (denial of 
service). All these can be done by changing or adding 
internal logic in such a way that it is very unlikely to be 
detected by traditional testing and verification tools and 
techniques [2]. 
Fig. 1: ASIC design flow [3] 
Different types of malicious logics are Trojan horse, trap 
door, logic bomb etc. A Trojan horse when invoked covertly 
performs some other action while performing its intended 
action, while a trap door is a secret entry into the program 
that allows some one who is aware of it to gain access to the 
program with out actually passing through the usual security 
procedures and logic bomb is a piece of code embedded in a 
legitimate program which becomes active at a predefined 
time or if a certain event is occurred. 
As the technology is ever growing the usage of small 
hand held security devices is ubiquitous and they rely on a 
greater extent on the tamper resistance property of these 
devices. However these tamper resistance is not outright. 
An attacker having access to the semiconductor test 
equipment can easily retrieve the key information in the 
chip by any of the methods wide known. It was believed 
that given sufficient investment any chip can be tampered. 
So the level of tamper resistance offered by any chip is can 
be measured by the time and cost penalty. A number of less 
expensive attack techniques are also known [14].  
In this paper we discussed various types of hardware 
attack techniques and possible remedies proposed by 
authors. 
II. TYPES OF ATTACKS 
A. Soft Errors 
In earlier days chip manufacturing components contains 
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small amounts of radioactive contaminants. The decay of 
these contaminants cause the soft errors due to the emission 
of high energy particles like alpha particles. The other 
sources of soft errors are neutrons, cosmic rays etc. when 
these high energy particles interact with the semiconductor 
electron-hole pairs will be generated. For an alpha particle 
is interacted with silicon, an energy of 3.6 eV is lost for 
every electron hole pair created [4] thus causing charge 
deposition. The number of electron hole pairs created 
depends on the energy of the sub atomic particle. Transistor 
source and diffusion nodes can collect these charges. If the 
charge collected is sufficiently high then that may invert the 
state of a logic device such as an SRAM cell, a latch, or a 
gate thereby introducing a logical fault into the circuit’s 
operation. [5]. 
Impact on circuits [6] 
An error due to a hit of a single particle was termed a 
single event upset (SEU). Its effects are temporary that lasts 
about 100ps and may corrupt the data stored and computed. 
For example consider an SRAM memory cell as shown in 
fig. 2. When the word line is low, the data will be stored in 
the cell using the inverters which are connected back-back. 
Now if an energetic particle strikes the cell and causes to 
flip one of the nodes, which in turn will be propagated to the 
other node causing both nodes to flip through a regenerative 
action. This way the data in the memory cell will be 
changes and the only way to get back to original state is to 
rewrite the content through the bit lines and this is not an 
ideal solution.  
Fig. 2 : SRAM Cell 
Soft errors can also be caused due to a particle interaction 
on the bit lines. In DRAM, in addition to the cell and bit line 
failure modes, another mode called combined cell bitline 
(CCB) failure mode is observed [7]. It was seen when both 
the cell and bitline collects the charge induced by the 
radiation but is insufficient to cause a SEU. Medium and 
Low end servers are largely affected by this soft error 
problem. 
B. Optical probing 
Optical probing is a semi-invasive method, which means 
it requires depackaging of the chick like invasive attacks but 
the passivation layer remains intact and because this method 
does not require electrical contact to the silicon and hence 
there is no mechanical damage to the silicon [8]. Laser 
radiations can ionize the IC’s semiconductor region if the 
photonic energy is greater than the band gap of the 
semiconductor. So by precisely focusing the Laser on to an  
Fig. 3: Microcontroller before and after depackaging. 
appropriately selected transistor on the chip, its state can be 
changed and there by corrupting the data stored. For 
example consider an attack on the typical SRAM memory. 
A standard depackaging procedure is applied on the chip to 
expose the SRAM memory and the results of depackaging 
are as shown in Fig. 3 [8].  
Now using a probing station the laser light can be focused 
very precisely on a precisely selected SRAM cell 
(magnified to about x1500) and the final state of the cell 
depends on the exposed layer. So by this way any individual 
bit of the SRAM cell can be changed. In other words, laser 
is used to induce a transient fault in one or more gates in 
such a way as to cause information leakage. 
These days this is the most powerful attack because 
unlike a glitch attack, the attacker can choose the location of 
the attack very precisely [13].  
C. Electromagnetic attack [9] 
Electromagnetic induction can be used to scan the data in 
the semiconductor. For this a miniature inductor can be built 
by wrapping several hundred turns of fine wire around the 
tip of the microprobe needle. When a current in injected into 
this coil, a magnetic field which is concentrated around the 
needle of the microprobe is generated. Now eddy current 
can be generated on the memory element when this test 
probe is placed a few microns over the surface of the 
element. These local currents in turn can be used to create 
faults. A map of the chip can be created by sensing this 
eddy current using an eddy current sensor [10]. A small 
perturbation on the memory cell using the same sensor is 
created to move the polarization point of the transistor a 
little [9]. Depending on the intensity of current required by 
the memory element to return to the initial value of the 
polarization point, the zero and one states can be identified.  
D. Thermal attack [11] 
Security processors handle very sensitive information 
which was not supposed to be read out or changed by any 
one. So these processors employ a volatile memory to store 
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this fragile information. On detection of a tampering attack 
these memory chips are powered down so that it can not be 
read by an attacker. But the problem here is if the data 
retention time of the chip is longer than the time taken by 
the attacker to read out the data, then obviously the sole 
purpose of security processor is doomed.  
The data retention time of the SRAM depends on the 
temperature. It was believed that at about -20ºC the data in 
the memory element is frozen which can be retrieved by the 
attacker. So some devices are designed with temperature 
sensing equipment which interprets any temperatures lower 
then -20ºC as a tampering event and shuts down the 
memory cell, there by erasing the secret keys stored. So an 
attacker who can get access to this location can subject the 
process to a lower temperature and causing the entire 
system to power down there by incurring heavy loss to the 
organization. Another point that has to be taken into 
consideration is that the data retention time in these 
processors depends on the temperature, i.e. the lower the 
temperature the greater the data retention period. 
Experiments proved that when a DRAM is subjected to a 
temperature of liquid nitrogen, the data decay is only 0.17% 
when isolated from the power [18] 
E. Glitch attack 
Clock signal glitches are currently the simplest and most 
practical glitch attacks. An attacker intentionally increases 
the clock frequency temporarily so that some flip-flops at 
the slower portion of the circuit fail to respond thus causing 
an error. This is particularly used to attack some part of the 
circuit because of different number of gate delays in various 
paths of the circuit. The effect of the attack depends on the 
timing and the duration of the glitch. For example in a CPU 
generally the program logic is much simpler than the 
instruction unit [15]. So any increase in the frequency 
causes instruction cycle to skip and instruction execution. 
This skipped instruction can be precisely chosen to be a 
password verification step or rather a crucial step. So by this 
way an attacker with a malicious intention can get access to 
valuable data. In addition these glitch attacks can reduce the 
run time of the cryptographic algorithm, so that the cipher 
can be decrypted easily [15].  
F. Timing attack 
Timing attack exploits the fact that the execution time of 
the cryptographic computation depends on the data that was 
being computed. So by analyzing the time taken by this 
computation the crypto key can be inferred [12, 16]. Since 
the instructions take a different number of cycles depending 
on the data inputs, a wide range of timing data is collected 
and analyzed to infer the crypto key [12].  
III. COUNTERMEASURES 
Similar to electrical fencing protection for houses, a metal 
layer is deposited on top of the actual circuit so that this 
metal layer can act as a sensor mesh. All the paths in the 
sensor mesh are continuously monitored for any interruption 
and short circuits [11]. This prevents selective etching and 
laser cutting accessing the bus which contains data. When 
an interruption or a short circuit is detected, mesh alarm can 
be triggered and countermeasures are initialized. Such 
meshes also make the penetration to the lower levels very 
difficult and thus complicating automatic reconstruction of 
the chip. But there are some limitations for using these 
sensor meshes as explained by [11]. 
Another defense approach proposed is chip coating. In 
this approach, a top layer metal shield is used to reflect the 
incident light thus making optical attack more difficult. 
Light sensors can also be used to detect a de-capsulated chip 
and prevent it from functioning. 
Mitigation techniques for single event upsets are 
classified as system-level methods (error detection and 
correction, lockstep execution, and redundant systems) and 
circuit level methods (radiation hardened circuits). The 
disadvantage of these techniques is they increase the 
transistor count and the area overhead [17] and this is 
because of the presence of additional circuitry on the chip. 
Another error correction design called Built-in soft error 
resilience (BISER) effectively overcomes this area overhead 
problem by utilizing the on chip resources such as on-chip 
scan design-for-testability for soft-error protection during 
normal operation [19]. 
The technique to protect from non-invasive attack is by 
using randomized clock signal. To protect the circuit from 
timing attacks the internal clock is driven by a random bit-
sequencer which in turn is driven by an external clock. It is 
also necessary for the processor to show an even 
characteristic current activity during the delay phases of the 
random clock else it is possible to construct the internal 
clock from the consumed current [11]. 
The suggested counter measure for the thermal attack is 
to redesign the SRAM that looses their state quickly when 
the power is removed even at lower temperatures. Another 
approach is to scatter the vital information such as 
passwords and crypto keys while storing in the RAM. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we analyzed various ways in which the 
malicious attacks can be performed on the embedded 
hardware. We also presented a basis which makes 
microcontrollers easy to penetrate and gather required 
information. We also presented some counter measures 
along with their limitations. Although some of the attacks 
like soft errors which may not be controlled completely at 
the design phase of the hardware, counter measures for most 
of the other attacks were widely available and can be 
implemented considering the tradeoffs associated with the 
development of particularly robust and secure hardware. 
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Because the post-manufacture security evaluation is time 
consuming and expensive a proper security protocol has to 
be considered at the design level of the hardware.  
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